Overcoming the ‘Regime of the Parties’ - Prof. Paul Eidelberg

Political parties have a bad reputation, particularly in Israel where they are so numerous, so narrow, and so noxious. Although parties serve the purpose of presenting and supporting candidates, they also muddle the relationship between the candidate and the voter. This is especially true in Israel, where citizens are compelled to vote for a party slate, and not an individual candidate representing a regional constituency. Recognizing these facts, some countries require open primaries, the registration of candidates rather than parties, and the funding of candidates by public means.



Israel is a ‘regime of the parties.’ Their primary function, David Ben-Gurion once said, is to divide the public treasury. Nevertheless, while parties are still necessary to democracy, it would serve Israel’s best interests to diminish their number and power. Here are three ways of doing this.



The first and simplest way is to raise the electoral threshold for seats in the legislature. The second is to adopt—and retain over time— the presidential model of government. Because only one candidate can win a national election for the presidency, voters will not want to waste their votes on small parties. This is why presidential governments usually produce a two-party system, the more readily when the legislature is constituted by multi-district elections—a third method of reducing the number and power of national parties.



What prevents the formation of a national two- or three- party system is that the Knesset continues to be based on a single national constituency with proportional representation.



Limiting the number of Israeli parties would enlarge their mental horizons; for to compete effectively in district elections, each party would have to consider the views and interests of diverse groups of citizens. This is why proportional representation is not necessarily conducive to the interests of minorities, even though the latter may win a few seats in the legislature. A legislature of numerous parties will be incapable of rational deliberation, to say nothing of petty rivalry and intrigue. This cannot but impair executive-legislative relations as well as a President’s ultimate function, which is to foster national unity.



Although various political scientists are critical of presidential government, their arguments are of limited validity. Invariably they refer to the failings of presidential systems in Latin America. I dare say, however, that parliamentary systems would probably fare no better. As John Quincy Adams saw some 180 years ago, the culture and class structure of most Latin American countries — their extremes of wealth and poverty — are not conducive to majoritarian democracy, parliamentary or presidential.



Critics also deplore the ‘dual sovereignty’ they associate with presidential governments. By this they mean that popular election of the president and of the legislature results in two competing ‘sovereignties.’ (A parliamentary system is immune to this phenomenon, since the ruling party controls both the executive and the legislature.) Linked to ‘dual sovereignty’ is the ‘gridlock’ that supposedly occurs in the United States when the President and the Congress are of opposite parties. But appearances are deceiving. Studies indicate that the passage of congressional legislation is usually independent of which party controls which branch of government. Public problems must be attended, and American politicians, unlike their Israeli counterparts, are more attentive to their constituents than to their parties.



Also, the notion of ‘dual sovereignty’ is misleading. A President represents the people in their collective capacity. He is expected to emphasize their common interests. This emphasis differs from that of a legislature whose members represent the particular interests of diverse constituencies. Although a legislator will presumably promote the common good, he is obliged to emphasize the concerns of his own constituents. (This applies to parliamentary governments with district elections, except that party-dominated parliamentary systems severely limit the independence of individual parliamentarians.)



Another defect attributed to presidential government is its fixed term. The truth is that parliamentary governments seldom succumb to a vote of no-confidence, meaning they usually run their allotted term. Politicians do not like to hazard their careers on new elections.



The one solid advantage of parliamentary systems is their ‘shadow governments,’ which enable experienced politicians to assume office when the ruling party falls from power. This does not apply, however, to Israel where any tyro can become a cabinet minister, thanks largely to the absence of district elections.



One way of compensating for the absence of a ‘shadow government’ is to require each presidential candidate (other than an incumbent President), to announce say five of his intended cabinet appointments. It may be assumed that only well-known, respected, and experienced public figures will be designated.



Finally, the presidential model is more consistent with Judaism than the parliamentary model. A president is an elected monarch. His election by the people is consistent with Jewish law. So too are multi-district elections. Combining the latter with a presidential system is the best way to overcome the ‘regime of the parties.’